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I. Introduction 
 
It is a well-worn criticism that the English law of constructive trusts in the context of 
family  homes  purchased  otherwise  than  by  married  couples  and  those  in  a  civil 
partnership is in a state of flux. Despite having used for over 40 years the ‘common 
intention constructive trust’ (CICT) device to provide an equitable division when the 
relationships of cohabitants break down, serious questions remain over the legitimacy of 
the exercise of judicial discretion. This is caused particularly by the judicial willingness to 
infer and even impute intention to reflect context-specific policy considerations, which 
upsets consistency and certainty in the law. This paper suggests that understanding the 
CICT as responding to secondary rights provides a better explanation and justification 
for the courts’ exercise of remedial discretion than the current approach taken by the 
courts.  
 
 
II. Primary/Secondary Rights and Constructive Trusts 
 
In  the  relevant  judgments  and  literature,  scant  reference  is  made  to  primary  and 
secondary rights, the focus being instead on the parties’ ‘intentions’. Nevertheless, it will 
be seen that the primary/secondary-rights approach is consistent with — and implicit in 
— the courts’ analysis of constructive trusts; and further, it offers a theoretical construct 
which helps us better understand what judges are really doing. 
 
II.1. The Distinction: Definition and Purpose 
 
According to John Austin, primary rights are rights that exist ‘in and per se’; secondary 
rights ‘arise out of violations of primary rights’.
1 Where A has a primary right against B, B 
owes a primary duty towards A, which does not arise from a wrong; where A has a 
secondary right, it arises from a civil wrong B commits when B breaches a primary duty.
2 
 
The primary/secondary rights distinction is a powerful conceptual tool for understanding 
private  law  remedies.
3 When  courts  enforce  A’s  primary  right  directly,  the  range  of 
potential  remedial  responses  is  narrow  and  limited.
4 They  are  logically  restricted  to 
enforcing the parties’ primary rights and duties, leaving no room for the exercise of 
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judicial discretion over the goal and content of the awarded remedy.
5 Since the remedy 
always compels B to carry out his primary duties, B’s breach of duty is not a necessary 
ingredient of the cause of action. For instance, in actions for a contractual debt due by A 
against B,
6 courts are concerned solely with compelling B to repay the debt, which is his 
primary duty under the contract; therefore B need not be shown to have breached the 
contract, and issues of causation, remoteness, and mitigation do not arise.  
 
In contrast, remedies which respond to secondary rights have a wider remedial potential, 
and are not as restrictive as in the case of primary rights.
7 Although discretion is not 
exercised as to the goal of the remedy, this being set by the primary right breached,
8 the 
appropriate content of the remedy is determined through the exercise of judicial discretion 
to make right the wrong B causes in a particular case. The remedy is wrong-based: B 
must  be  shown  to  have  breached  a  primary  duty.  Where  A  suffers  loss,  issues  of 
causation,  remoteness,  and  mitigation  become  relevant.
9 For  instance,  in  actions  for 
contractual damages,
10 B’s breach of contract must be shown to have caused A’s loss, 
and B will only be liable for losses which are not too remote.  
 
II.2. ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary Rights’ Constructive Trust Doctrines 
 
Different constructive trusts respond to different events.
11 The CICT concerns, at least 
in part, the informal acquisition of beneficial interests based on the parties’ intentions. 
Since s 53(1)(b) (where B is sole legal owner) or s 53(1)(c) (where A and B are co-legal 
owners) of the Law of Property Act 1925 is not complied with,
12 the enforced trust is not 
express  but  constructive  in  nature.  Nevertheless,  A  obtains  the  intended  equitable 
interest by virtue of s 53(2), which provides that s 53(1)(b) and (c) does ‘not affect the 
creation or operation of resulting, implied or constructive trusts.’  
 
Apart  from  the  CICT,  we  can  easily  identify  a  number  of  other  well-established 
constructive trust doctrines which respond (at least in part) to parties’ intentions. Thus, 
the doctrine in Rochefoucauld v Boustead
13 and the doctrine in Pallant v Morgan
14 have been 
identified as ‘[w]ell-known examples of … a constructive trust’
15 ‘by which both parties 
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intend to create a trust from the outset’.
16 Likewise, constructive trusts are commonly 
imposed in proprietary estoppel, especially where the parties have made a ‘bargain’ — a 
promise to cede an interest in return for a defined quid pro quo.
17  
 
In  the  doctrine  in  Rochefoucauld  v  Boustead
 18 and  the  doctrine  in  Pallant  v  Morgan,
19 B 
promises to hold some interest in property yet to be acquired on trust for A, and A’s 
reliance on B’s promise increases B’s opportunity of acquiring that property, whether or 
not by transferring the property to B. A constructive trust is invariably imposed to grant 
A the promised interest without the exercise of any remedial discretion. It prevents B 
from taking an advantage for himself contrary to the parties’ agreement.  
 
In these doctrines, A’s primary right arises from the moment B acquires the property. It 
does not depend on a wrong, that is, B’s denial of A’s promised right. Thus, B incurs 
custodial duties
20 and a duty to account
21 from the moment of acquisition. These primary 
rights and duties arise under a constructive trust by operation of law, and a ‘constructive 
trust’  award  is  purely  declaratory:  the  court  invariably  recognises  and  enforces  the 
primary  relationship  between  the  parties,  compelling  B  to  carry  out  his  pre-existing 
primary duties. This explains the remedial inflexibility. 
 
In contrast, proprietary estoppel remedies give effect to A’s secondary rights. Proprietary 
estoppel  arises  where  B  induces  A  to  assume,  through  a  promise,  assurance,  or 
acquiescence in A’s mistaken belief, that B will cede an interest in property he owns to A, 
and A detrimentally relies on the assumption. Guided by the notion of the ‘minimum 
equity to do justice to the plaintiff’,
22 the imposed remedy aims to achieve proportionality 
between  A’s  detriment  and  B’s  role  in  inducing  it.
23 A  constructive  trust  is  often 
imposed,
24 but  compensatory  damages  (or  ‘equitable  compensation’)  may  also  be 
awarded.
25 The availability of compensatory damages indicates that the doctrine gives 
effect to A’s secondary right,
26 since ‘“damages” means … a monetary award given for a 
wrong.’
27 It  follows  that  proprietary  estoppel  remedies,  proprietary  or  personal,  give 
effect  to  A’s  secondary  right.  A  must  therefore  establish  a  causal  link  between  B’s 
promise  or  assurance  and  A’s  detriment,
28 and  this  is  fulfilled  when  A’s  reliance  is 
established. Moreover, the application of the ‘minimum equity’ concept prevents B from 
being liable for any of A’s detriment which is too remote.  
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As for the primary duty B breaches, Michael Spence suggests that B has a ‘duty to ensure 
the reliability of induced assumptions’.
29 He writes:
30 
 
The primary obligation is that [B] must, in so far as he is reasonably able, prevent 
harm to [A]. ‘Harm’ consists in the extent to which [A] is worse off because the 
assumption has proved unjustified than he would have been had it never been 
induced. The secondary obligation is that, if [A] does suffer harm of the relevant 
type, and [B] might reasonably have prevented it, then [B] must compensate [A] 
for the harm he has suffered. 
 
This gives a plausible account for why the elements of assurance or promise, reliance, 
and  detriment  are  required:
31 only  when  these  are  fulfilled  will  B  have  breached  his 
primary duty, giving A a cause of action in proprietary estoppel. Unlike the ‘primary 
rights’ constructive trust doctrines, the fundamental concern is the correction of reliance 
losses.
32 Because there can be various degrees of detriment suffered and expectations 
formed, by ‘seek[ing] to react to multiple considerations’,
33 proprietary estoppel allows 
courts to exercise remedial discretion in order to tailor the content of the remedy to 
achieve the goal of compensation. 
 
 
III. The CICT: A Primary-Rights Approach  
 
This section explains how the present judicial approach to the CICT reflects a primary-
rights approach. It will be explained later why this approach causes difficulties for a 
coherent analysis of the law. 
 
III.1. ‘Common Intention’ 
 
The touchstone of the CICT is the concept of a ‘common intention’ — an ‘agreement, 
arrangement or understanding reached between [the parties] that the property is to be 
shared beneficially.’
34 There are two stages to the process by which this is evaluated. First, 
it is ascertained whether there is a ‘common intention’ at all that A will acquire a share of 
B’s beneficial interest (the ‘acquisition’ stage). This can be shown by evidence of express 
discussion or be inferred from the parties’ conduct, but may not be imputed.
35 If such an 
intention is adjudged to exist, courts then consider the proportion each party is to have 
(the ‘quantification’ stage). A ‘common intention’ may be imputed at this second stage in 
the  absence  of  express  or  inferred  intention.
36 Where  B  is  the  sole  legal  owner  the 
starting point is that B owns the entire beneficial interest in the property; in relation to 
legal co-owners their ‘beneficial ownership [is presumed to] be joint, so that it is held in 
equal shares’.
37 The burden of proof is on the party (A) who disputes his presumed 
beneficial interest.
38 
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It has been suggested that the acquisition stage is irrelevant where the parties are legal co-
owners, since they ‘already share the beneficial interest’.
39 However, the material question 
at the acquisition stage in every case is not merely whether A should acquire a share in the 
property,  but  whether  A  should  acquire  a  portion  of  B’s  prima  facie  share.
40 In  legal  co-
ownership cases, the parties’ presumed starting point of equal shares is not based on the 
parties’ ‘common intention’ but a conclusion of law.
41 Therefore, it remains necessary to 
determine whether the parties had a ‘common intention’ at all that A should acquire a 
portion of B’s prima facie 50% share.  
 
III.2. A Primary-Rights Approach 
 
The  present  understanding  of  the  CICT  reflects  a  primary-rights  approach.
42 Judges 
repeatedly emphasise that their main concern is ‘to ascertain the parties’ actual shared 
intentions’,
43 independent of B’s breach of any duty. Courts perceive their role to be 
purely  declaratory:  they  simply  recognise  and  enforce  the  parties’  primary  rights  and 
duties. Just like the ‘primary rights’ constructive trust doctrines, the operative event is 
said to be the parties’ intentions. Hence the judicial reluctance to impute intention at the 
acquisition  stage:  judges  are  unwilling  to  make  B  liable  where  there  was  no  actual 
agreement to that effect.  
 
A primary-rights approach is also detected at the quantification stage. The first CICT 
case involved the House of Lords eschewing any jurisdiction to exercise substantive 
remedial  discretion;
44 and  the  same  approach  is  taken  today.  Thus,  judges  refuse  to 
impose  a  remedy  ‘contrary  to  what  the  evidence  shows  that  [the  parties]  actually 
intended’ in relation to quantification.
45 This hesitancy to exercise discretion indicates 
that the remedy is logically limited to enforcing the parties’ primary rights and duties. 
Courts claim that the process of imputation — an exercise that allows the exercise of 
judicial discretion — is merely a ‘fallback position’ based on necessity: where no actual 
intention  is  found  at  the  quantification  stage,  ‘the  court  has  a  duty  to  come  to  a 
conclusion on the dispute put before it’
46 — hence the need to impute. Thus the claim 
that the ability to impute is only ‘a small chink of darkness’: ‘it merely fills the gap, where 
there is one, as to how the beneficial interest under that institutional trust are [sic] to be 
assigned.’
47 It is clear that the courts take a primary-rights approach to the CICT. 
 
 
IV. Difficulties with the Primary-Rights Approach 
 
Upon closer scrutiny, the reality emerges that the CICT does not give effect to A’s 
primary rights, revealing a disparity between what judges claim to be doing and what they 
actually do in practice. 
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42 See too Terence Etherton, ‘Constructive Trusts and Proprietary Estoppel: The Search for Clarity and Principle’ 
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43 Jones (n 35) [31], [46]. See also Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886, 898; Stack (n 37) [37]. 
44 Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777. 
45 Jones (n 35) [47]. 
46 Jones (n 35) [47]. 
47 Lord Neuberger, ‘The Remedial Constructive Trust — Fact or Fiction’, speech at the Banking Services and Finance 
Law Association Conference, Queenstown, 10 August 2014 <http://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-140810.pdf 
> [18]–[19].   6 
IV.1. Imputation-Related Difficulties 
 
In principle, imputation — the process of attributing to the parties an intention they 
never  had
48 —  is  inconsistent  with  a  primary-rights  approach.  A  remedy  based  on 
imputed intention hardly enforces a pre-existing relationship which arose in response to 
the parties’ intentions.  
 
IV.1.1. The Acquisition Stage 
 
At  the  acquisition  stage,  short  of  evidence  of  an  express  discussion,
49 the  parties’ 
intentions can only be inferred.
50 An inferred intention ‘is objectively deduced to be the 
subjective actual intention of the parties, in the light of their actions and statements.’
51 
The refusal to impute intentions gives the appearance of judges searching for the actual 
intentions of the parties. However, due to the multifariousness of interactions between 
the parties, judges can essentially ‘cherry pick’ specific episodes over the course of their 
relationship to infer a ‘common intention’. ‘Nearly any case [can] be made “special”’.
52 
Considering that a fine — often indistinguishable — line exists between a ‘candid’ and 
‘sophisticated’ claimant,
53 a ‘sympathetic’ and non-sympathetic judge,
54 and words spoken 
‘in earnest’ and ‘in dalliance’,
55 the ability to infer intention often allows for the exercise 
of  judicial  discretion,  albeit  masquerading  as  an  evidential  inquiry.  Inference  then 
becomes very much like imputation. This is a far cry from the way an agreement is 
treated in the ‘primary rights’ constructive trust doctrines, where judges insist that there 
must be a bargain which sufficiently defines the parties’ respective beneficial interest in 
the property,
56 and that B must give ‘an assurance’ to A as opposed to merely extending 
‘a friendly gesture’.
57  
 
Another difficulty at the acquisition stage concerns detrimental reliance.
58 Where there is 
an  express  ‘common  intention’,  A’s  detrimental  reliance  can  arise  from  his  financial 
contribution to the house or other actions; if the ‘common intention’ is inferred from the 
parties’ conduct, then that very conduct would also count as detrimental reliance.
59 Given 
that  express  ‘common  intention’  is  a  ‘rarer  class  of  case’,
60 in  practice  determining 
‘common  intention’  and  detrimental  reliance  is  conflated  in  the  process  of  inferring 
intention. However, this allows ‘common intention’ to be inferred from A’s conduct 
alone,
61 without investigating whether a ‘common intention’ (properly so-called) exists on 
the facts. This provides an avenue for imputing intentions through the back door. That 
is, where intention is inferred from the parties’ words and actions although there is no 
evidence whatsoever of B making assurances and A relying thereon, this is identical to 
imputing intention, ‘since there can be no point in the court investigating whether [A] 
has  relied  to  her  detriment  on  a  fictional  common  intention  that  the  court  has 
                                                                    
48 Stack (n 37) [126]. 
49 Rosset (n 34) 132. 
50 Stack (n 37) [69]. 
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53 Gissing (n 43) 897. 
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55 Hammond v Mitchell [1991] 1 WLR 1127, 1139. 
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57 Pallant (n 14) 46. 
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59 Grant (n 58) 647. 
60 Grant (n 58) 647. 
61 See eg James v Thomas [2007] EWCA Civ 1212 [27] and Morris v Morris [2008] EWCA Civ 257 [26].   7 
invented.’
62 It is fundamentally questionable whether the imposition of a constructive 
trust in this case is justified, given that A’s lack of reliance would be fatal to his claim 
under  both  ‘primary  rights’  and  ‘secondary  rights’  constructive  trust  doctrines.  If  A 
commits to a certain course of action when there is no evidence that B intends for A to 
acquire property thereby, surely A takes a risk that his efforts will go uncompensated.
63 
 
IV.1.2. The Quantification Stage 
 
At  the  quantification  stage,  while  judges  claim  that  actual  —  express  or  inferred  — 
intention is paramount, in practice it is extremely rare for parties in a familial context to 
have formed the relevant actual intention.
64 Where found, it can, moreover, be easily 
sidestepped, either by holding that the agreement did not apply to the events which 
transpired,
65 or by holding that any discussion concerning quantification was not ‘exact’
66 
enough, thereby warranting imputation.
67 The upshot is that in the majority of cases 
courts  impute  intentions  at  this  stage.  The  ability  to  vary  the  size  of  the  parties’ 
respective beneficial shares strongly indicates that the remedy imposed does not merely 
enforce the parties’ primary rights and duties, but instead reflects the exercise of remedial 
discretion. 
 
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s analysis of imputation as merely a ‘fallback position’
68 does 
not withstand scrutiny. Consider the doctrine in Pallant v Morgan where, absent a firm 
agreement concerning apportionment, the beneficial interest in the property is invariably 
equally  divided.
69 Why  does  this  default  apportionment  rule  not  apply  in  the  CICT 
context? Where an actual agreement in relation to quantification is lacking, A should 
obtain half of B’s equitable interest in the property by default. That is, A would obtain a 
50% interest in the property where B is sole legal owner, and 75%
70 where the parties are 
legal co-owners. The point is that it is in fact unnecessary for courts to impute intention in 
order to resolve a dispute. The ability to vary the parties’ respective beneficial interests is 
therefore an exercise of remedial discretion masquerading as a rule based on necessity.  
 
IV.1.3. Attempts to Minimise the Difficulty 
 
In Jones,  the  majority  attempted  to  play  down  the  distinction  between  inference  and 
imputation, reliance being placed on Nick Piska’s observation
71 that the two concepts 
present a ‘distinction without a difference’.
72 Piska’s argument is based on the obvious 
inability of a judge to step into the minds of the parties to determine their subjective 
intentions;  from  this  he  concludes  that  inference  and  imputation  are  substantively 
similar, since both are concerned with objectively determining the parties’ intentions from 
                                                                    
62 Charles Mitchell, Hayton and Mitchell: Commentary and Cases on the Law of Trusts and Equitable Remedies (13th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2010) [15-30]. 
63 Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd [2008] UKHL 55. 
64 Williamson v Sheikh [2008] EWCA Civ 990 is a rare example. 
65 Gallarotti v Sebastianelli [2012] EWCA Civ 865 [23]. 
66 Jones (n 35) [47]. 
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69 Holiday Inns Inc v Broadhead (Ch, 19 December 1969), as reported in Banner Homes (n 16) 390. 
70 Upon severance of the initial joint tenancy in equity, each party has a 50% share (Goodman v Gallant [1986] Fam 106; 
Hunter v Babbage [1994] 2 FLR 806). Obtaining half of B’s 50% share (i.e. 25%) and adding this to A’s own 50% share, 
A obtains a 75% share in the property.  
71 Nick Piska, ‘Intention, Fairness and the Presumption of Resulting Trust after Stack v Dowden’ (2008) 71 MLR 120, 
127 – 8. 
72 Jones (n 35) [34], [65] – [66].   8 
the facts. This argument is fallacious. Inference involves objectively concluding from the 
parties’ words or actions that they did lead each other to form a common intention;
73 
imputation involves attributing an intention despite  concluding from the facts that the 
parties could not reasonably have led each other to form that intention.
74 Inference is 
based on the facts of the case — the parties’ words or actions; imputation is based on a 
norm — that of ‘fairness’.
75 Conceptually, imputation is clearly different from inference, 
the former involving far more judicial discretion than the latter. 
 
Secondly,  in  Stack  the  CICT  was  confined  to  the  ‘domestic  consumer  context’.
76 
Presumably  one  concern  was  that  inferring  or  imputing  intention  would  destabilise 
business  transactions.  Yet,  the  domestic/business  distinction  is  inherently  unhelpful, 
causing uncertainty where the parties’ use of the property
77 or the parties’ relationship is  
atypical.
78 In  fact,  the  Court  of  Appeal  has,  post-Jones,  analysed  cases  relating  to 
investment properties
79 and properties bought by business associates
80 in CICT terms. 
Clearly, it is the difficulties raised by imputation cannot be confined, which is an obvious 
cause for concern. 
 
IV.2. Severance-Related Difficulties 
 
Since legal co-owners are presumed to hold as joint tenants, the CICT can only be said to 
give effect to A’s primary rights if the event which severs their equitable joint tenancy 
can be identified. It is trite law that severance occurs only through specific methods such 
as written notice,
81 operating on one’s share, mutual agreement, course of dealing,
82 or 
the murder of a joint tenant.
83 The CICT does not reflect any of these. In particular, 
given  that  ‘common  intention’  can  be  inferred  where  none  actually  existed,  ‘[a]n 
uncommunicated declaration … cannot operate as a severance.’
84 The only remaining 
plausible explanation is that the severance occurs by court order. If so, then the CICT 
certainly does not give effect to A’s primary right, since the court would not simply be 
enforcing a pre-existing relationship, but instead exercising discretion to sever the joint 
tenancy. 
 
IV.3. Policy-Related Difficulties 
 
Difficulties also arise in squaring the policy considerations specific to the cohabitation 
context with ‘primary rights’ constructive trusts principles. When dealing with ‘primary 
rights’ constructive trust doctrines, courts are concerned solely with identifying whether a 
pre-trial event — an agreement — triggers the parties’ primary rights and duties prior to 
the court order. Conversely, in applying the CICT, courts take policy considerations at 
trial to be more important than ascertaining the existence of a pre-existing relationship. 
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By unnaturally forcing their desired conclusion to fit into the primary-rights approach, 
judges distort orthodox ‘primary rights’ constructive trusts principles.  
 
Indeed,  one  detects  a  fundamental  clash  of  norms.  In  relation  to  ‘primary  rights’ 
constructive trust doctrines, one of equity’s primary concerns is the ‘[respect] for genuine 
intentions … out of a libertarian respect for autonomy’.
85 Courts wish to reflect the same 
norm in the CICT by using the ‘common intention’ concept. Yet, the willingness directly 
or indirectly to impute a ‘common intention’ indicates the contrary — a lack of respect 
for  the  parties’  autonomy.  It  is  difficult  to  justify  suppressing  this  policy  concern  in 
favour of those commonly rehearsed concerning family homes.
86 
 
 
V. The Secondary Rights-Approach 
 
It  is  submitted  that  a  better  approach  is  to  analyse  the  CICT  as  responding  to  A’s 
secondary rights. Enforcing B’s secondary duty allows the exercise of judicial discretion 
to tailor the content and size of the remedy to achieve a particular goal. Such remedial 
flexibility explains the willingness to impute intentions at the quantification stage. The 
yardstick for imputation, being ‘fair[ness] having regard to the whole course of dealing’,
87 
can (tentatively)
88 be cast as the remedial goal, which guides the exercise of remedial 
discretion.
89 On the secondary-rights approach, the remedy ultimately has nothing to do 
with enforcing an agreement between the parties, but something else — the putting right 
of the consequences of B’s breach of duty.  
 
V.1. Ingredients of the Claim 
 
It is possible to analyse the CICT as fulfilling the necessary ingredients of a secondary 
rights claim — a primary duty, breach, loss, and causation. Inspiration can be drawn 
from  proprietary  estoppel,  which  is  the  only  equitable  doctrine  which  enforces  B’s 
secondary duty to allow A informally to acquire proprietary rights. While the secondary-
rights approach does not provide a perfect fit for every CICT case, it is suggested that 
the renewed approach leads to more justifiable outcomes, and far better explains the 
exercise of judicial discretion than the current approach.  
 
V.1.1. Primary Duty 
 
What is B’s primary duty? The primary duty in the context of proprietary estoppel can be 
adopted: B has a ‘duty to ensure the reliability of induced assumptions’.
90 B must be 
deemed, ‘by his words or conduct [to have] induced [A] to act to his own detriment in 
the reasonable belief that by so acting he was acquiring a beneficial interest in the land.’
91 
B’s  duty  is  not  to  fulfil  A’s  expectations  from  the  very  moment  B  induces  such 
assumptions; rather, it is to ensure A does not suffer harm — detriment — through 
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relying on the induced assumption. Thus, B’s primary duty is to ensure that A does not suffer 
harm from the unreliability of B’s induced assumptions. 
 
Since A’s assumption can be induced through acquiescence, representation, or promise,
92 
courts do not need to stretch the ‘common intention’ concept to provide a remedy. It 
also  becomes  unnecessary  to  find  or  invent  the  element  of  mutuality  that  ‘common 
intention’ evokes; it suffices that A’s assumption was induced by B. This does not distort 
the present law. In cases where an express ‘common intention’ has been found to exist, B 
would to the same extent be found to have induced A’s assumptions; in cases where a 
‘common intention’ has been inferred, the often fictitious ‘intention’ can likewise more 
realistically be reanalysed as an inducement of A’s assumptions by B. 
 
V.1.2. Breach 
 
B must have breached his primary duty. This can be analysed as occurring when B deals 
with the property inconsistently with the induced assumption — when it becomes clear 
that  B  cannot,  will  not,  and/or  has  not  transfer(red)  to  A  the  beneficial  interest  A 
expects. This will be so, for instance, where B unilaterally acts on his whole (in sole-name 
cases) or half (in joint-names cases) beneficial interest to the exclusion of A, such as by 
mortgaging, selling, or letting the property. This is the earliest point when A can be said 
to have suffered harm which is caused by the unreliability of B’s induced assumptions, 
thus constituting a breach of B’s primary duty. 
 
Could B avoid the breach by discharging his primary duty? In most cases, it is ambiguous 
as to when precisely A will acquire some of B’s beneficial interest.
93 The most obvious 
way that B can avoid the breach would be to secure A his expected interest as soon as 
practicable. If B fails to do so, that failure constitutes a wrong, even though it might not be 
B’s fault. The strict nature of the wrong should not be surprising: B always has a positive 
role to play in inducing A’s assumptions, and thus the risk that A would be harmed if the 
primary duty is not discharged ought properly to lie with B. 
 
It may be objected that B will often be unaware of his duty to transfer an interest to A at 
all. There are two possible readings of this objection. First, it may point to the courts’ 
present  ability  to  infer  intention  even  though  B  is  in  fact  unaware  that  a  ‘common 
intention’ ever existed. To this, it is submitted that the current law is, to that extent, 
misguided, since this is tantamount to imputing intention at the acquisition stage in the 
absence of any actual ‘common intention’. Second, this objection may point to the fact 
that B’s inducement might not consist of a ‘one-off’ act such as making a promise, but 
through a sequence of events over time, such that B is unaware of precisely when an 
induced assumption has in fact ‘crystallised’. In reply, it can be noted that B does not 
need to be subjectively aware that he has induced A’s assumption at all, since B need not 
be  at  fault  to  commit  a  breach.  So  long  as  B  had  in  fact  objectively  induced  A’s 
assumptions, any unilateral action which excludes A is a breach of B’s primary duty.  
 
It might be further objected that, even if B wishes to fulfil his primary duty by formally 
declaring a trust (in sole-name cases) or disposing his beneficial interest (in joint-names 
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cases) in A’s favour, it may not be clear what proportion of B’s interest A ought to have. 
This scenario is highly unlikely in practice; yet B has two options. He could breach his 
primary duty anyway to allow a judge subsequently to rule on the matter; alternatively, 
drawing an analogy from the doctrine in Pallant v Morgan,
94 B could transfer a half-share 
of his beneficial interest to A as a rule of thumb. The latter option would not prevent A 
from suing B for a larger share on the basis that some outstanding ‘harm’ is yet to be 
compensated for, but it would be extremely difficult for A to succeed on this point.  
 
V.1.3. Loss 
 
A must have suffered loss or harm due to B’s breach. This can be squared with the 
requirement to establish detrimental reliance in a CICT claim.
95  
 
‘Detriment’ is commonly used in two very different ways. When used as an adjective, it 
describes the event of reliance. This can be labelled ‘detriment-as-event’. For instance, if 
A’s reliance involves making a financial contribution or foregoing an opportunity, these 
acts in themselves are ‘detrimental’ insofar as that word refers to A’s costs in terms of time, 
money, and effort. Characterising A’s acts as ‘detrimental’ in this sense focuses wholly on 
A; it does not involve evaluating A’s position vis-à-vis B. In contrast, ‘detriment’ may 
describe the net harm A ultimately suffers, all things considered. This can be labelled 
‘detriment-as-harm’.  If  B  fulfils  A’s  expectation,  A  suffers  no  detriment-as-harm:  by 
fulfilling B’s primary duty, B will not have caused A to suffer any net harm. Conversely, 
if (and only if) B breaches his primary duty would A suffer detriment-as-harm: he would 
be left worse off than he would have been had B never induced A’s assumption. It is this 
latter sense of ‘detriment’ which needs to be demonstrated.
96 
 
V.1.4. Causation 
 
B’s breach must have caused A’s harm for which compensation is sought. The element 
of causation can be squared with the requirement to establish detrimental reliance in a 
CICT  claim.
97 As  Mustill  LJ  observed  in  Grant  v  Edwards,
98 ‘the  court  must  decide 
whether [A’s] conduct is referable to the bargain, promise or intention.’ There has been a 
dearth of authorities concerning the requisite causal link, with conflicting tests emerging 
from  fleeting  judicial  considerations  of  this  point.  A  ‘but  for’  or  ‘sole  cause’  test  is 
sometimes posited;
99 at other times an ‘a cause’ test is detected.
100 This uncertainty leaves 
it open to courts to develop the causal test in line with proprietary estoppel, where the 
precise test depends on whether the claim is based on B’s acquiescence, representation, 
or promise.
101  
 
V.1.5. An Unliquidated Secondary Right to Compensation 
 
Once B breaches the primary duty which causes A to suffer detrimental reliance, A 
obtains an unliquidated secondary right to compensation, the content of which must be 
liquidated by a court. This provides an explanation for the oft-found exercise of judicial 
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discretion  in  CICT  cases  to  determine  the  parties’  respective  share  in  the  property 
according to what is ‘fair’.
102 This discretion afforded by the CICT can be contrasted with 
‘primary  rights’  constructive  trust  doctrines,  where  in  the  absence  of  an  express 
agreement as to the parties’ respective shares, the parties invariably hold the beneficial 
interest in the property in equal shares.
103 
 
A  secondary-rights  approach  would  also  allow  judges  to  deviate  from  an  express 
agreement between the parties concerning their respective shares. Although the Supreme 
Court has advised against this,
104 in practice courts are willing to sidestep the express 
agreement in favour of imposing what they deem to be a ‘fair’ share.
105 Moreover, if 
‘fairness’  is  the  yardstick,  then  courts  can  easily  conclude  that  an  express  agreement 
between the parties is ‘unfair’. As David Hayton observes, ‘[i]f [A]’s detrimental conduct 
on a scale of one to 100 only registers 10 she should not necessarily obtain a promised 
half share’.
106 
 
V.2. Benefits of the Secondary-Rights Approach 
 
The secondary-rights approach to the CICT is beneficial for a number of reasons. First, 
it  better  explains  the  discretion  which  courts  at  present  exercise  by  unjustifiably 
stretching the ‘common intention’ concept: the renewed understanding analyses judges as 
exercising  the  remedial  discretion  inherent  in  liquidating  A’s  secondary  right  to 
compensation. Just as in proprietary estoppel, ‘[i]f reasonable expectation induced by [B] 
can be accepted as forming the first limb of the doctrine, we can jettison the subtleties of 
intentions,  promises  and  their  implicit  contents.  The  crucial  issue  then  turns  on  the 
circumstances in which [A]’s expectations will be enforced.’
107 
 
Secondly, the secondary-rights approach is more conceptually coherent. It encourages a 
move  away  from  the  touchstone  of  ‘common  intention’,  and  thus  discourages  the 
fictitious imposition of an actual agreement where none existed. In its stead, courts are 
encouraged to address the questions of whether B has induced A’s assumption through 
B’s words or actions, and whether A has detrimentally relied on this. Importantly, the 
secondary-rights  approach  removes  the  need  forcefully  to  align  the  CICT  with  the 
‘primary rights’ doctrines since they are analysed as performing different functions. It 
nevertheless remains possible, on the renewed approach, to maintain the view that courts 
will not generally override the parties’ actual intentions at the quantification stage.
108 The 
explanation lies not in taking this as evidence that courts are responding to primary 
rights, but by analogising this to the courts’ approach in ‘bargain’ cases in proprietary 
estoppel — involving B promising to cede an interest to A in return for a defined quid pro 
quo — where A’s expectation interest is almost always protected.
109 
 
Thirdly, the renewed approach to the CICT renders it unnecessary artificially to constrain 
the ambit of this area of law to the ‘domestic consumer context’ in order to take into 
account contextual policy concerns. Instead, these can be taken into consideration when 
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judges exercise discretion to determine the appropriate content of the awarded remedy. 
Indeed, policy concerns that are particular to any relationship, ‘domestic’ or ‘commercial’, 
can be accommodated within the secondary-rights framework. 
 
Finally, the secondary-rights approach suggests a solution to the severance problem in 
joint-names cases, by explaining severance as occurring by ‘course of dealing sufficient to 
intimate  that  the  interests  of  all  were  mutually  treated  as  constituting  a  tenancy  in 
common’.
110 On this view, severance occurs when B induces an expectation that A will 
obtain some of B’s beneficial interest and when A acts in reliance — actions which are 
manifestly  inconsistent  with  survivorship.  Both  inducement  and  reliance  must  have 
occurred, since both parties must have dealt with their interests as if they are interests in 
common and not joint.
111 It follows that B can renege on the induced assumption before 
A has detrimentally relied on it, leaving the joint tenancy intact. Also, if B’s inducement 
and  A’s  reliance  are  complete  and  a  court  ultimately  awards  mere  compensatory 
damages, then the parties will share the already-severed beneficial interest in the property 
in equal shares.
112 This helpfully explains what judges are trying to do when they apply 
the  ‘equality  is  equity’  maxim
113 to  joint-names  cases,  while  avoiding  the  pitfalls  of 
analytical inconsistency.  
 
 
VI. Going Further: The CICT as a Specific Application of 
Proprietary Estoppel 
 
If we accept the secondary-rights approach to the CICT, and if we further accept the 
parallel of this approach with proprietary estoppel, then it is only a small step further to 
suggest  that  the  CICT  ought  to  be  analysed  as  a  specific  application  of  proprietary 
estoppel. Some commentators have opposed this suggestion, and their concerns require 
evaluation. 
 
The most common objection relates to the remedial differences. It has been argued
114 
that the CICT leads only to a constructive trust award, unlike proprietary estoppel where 
a monetary award is possible. While this is descriptively accurate, the difference appears 
to be more apparent than real. It is already commonplace for A to plead both the CICT 
and proprietary estoppel as alternative claims. Assimilating the CICT within proprietary 
estoppel does not deprive A, since a judge can award a constructive trust or a lesser 
remedy depending on the merits of a particular case. This would certainly encourage a 
more efficacious legal system.  
 
A  related  objection  is  that  the  CICT  and  proprietary  estoppel  have  irreconcilably 
different  ‘goals’,  the  former  being  ‘fairness’
115 and  the  latter  being  compensation. 
However, it is strongly arguable that ‘fairness’ is too imprecise a yardstick, since it is 
liable to afford unbridled discretion to the courts. Rather, ‘compensation’ provides a 
more refined yardstick: not only is it ‘fair’ to compensate A for harm caused by B, it also 
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aligns the current law on family homes with the well-established doctrine of proprietary 
estoppel. 
 
Another objection points to the inability of proprietary estoppel to explain the current 
judicial inference of ‘common intention’ at the acquisition stage. Thus, Mee argues that 
the courts’ willingness to infer ‘common intention’ from A’s financial contribution to the 
acquisition of the property does not amount to a ‘representation’ for the purposes of 
proprietary  estoppel.
116 Gardner  too  argues  that  A  often  does  not  suffer  detrimental 
reliance in the CICT cases, since there can be no reliance on an invented intention.
117 In 
reply, it is observed, first, that a ‘representation’ by B is not necessary on the secondary-
rights approach: A’s assumption can even be induced by acquiescence. Secondly, it seems 
strange to conclude from the differences between proprietary estoppel and the CICT 
that both doctrines ought to be kept separate. Given the courts’ repeated refusal to 
invent ‘common intention’ at the acquisition stage, it is sensible to conclude instead that 
A ought not to succeed if he can only rely on fictitious intention. Instead, A ought only 
to obtain a remedy where he suffers harm caused by the unreliability of B’s induced 
assumptions that he will obtain a share of B’s beneficial interest in the property. 
 
A  final  objection  contends  that  remedies  which  give  effect  to  secondary  rights  are 
different  from  the  CICT,  because  the  former  only  has  prospective  effect.
118 The 
argument is that prospective remedies disadvantage A if B deals with X (a third party) 
prior to a court order, since A would not have any rights enforceable against X.
119 There 
are two possible replies. First, given the artificiality of ‘common intention’ in the present 
law, surely even on a primary-rights approach it is at the judge’s discretion to determine 
when precisely A’s proprietary right arises ‘prior to the court order’. In this regard, the 
secondary-rights approach commendably removes a fiction in favour of recognising that 
it is ultimately judicial discretion at play. Secondly, as s 116(a) of the Land Registration 
Act 2002
120 confirms,
121 A’s equity by estoppel is proprietary in nature and capable of 
binding X.
122 The secondary-rights approach reveals the mechanics of the remedy: A 
obtains an equity by estoppel — an unliquidated secondary right — when B breaches his 
primary duty; this is liquidated at the day of judgment. Where a proprietary remedy is 
awarded,  its  proprietary  effect  is  backdated,  ‘by  virtue  of  some  doctrine  of  relation 
back’,
123 to the time of B’s breach; where a merely personal remedy is awarded, A has no 
proprietary right against X, since A’s equity by estoppel was, after all, merely capable of’ 
binding X. Since A obtains an ‘equity by estoppel’ only when B commits a breach, A 
therefore  only  has  priority  over  X  where  B  deals  with  X  post-breach  (and  where  a 
proprietary remedy is ultimately awarded); so, for instance, A obtains no right against X 
if B deals with X before A incurs detrimental reliance. 
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